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1. A long-run perspective on
energy & the Industrial Revolution
Britain’s Industrial Revolution & Energy Transition: 
C16th-C19th
In a long drawn-out transition, Britain went:
 From a traditional agricultural economy: renewable 
energy flows limited by productivity of land & technology
 To a new regime: growth, welfare & pollution transformed 
by depleting fossil stock for larger energy flows (Wrigley)
 With innovations including
 Cotton mills & new spinning & weaving technologies
 Steam engine
 Substituting coal/coke for wood in metal manufacture
 Social, political, institutional & technological changes
 New manufactured consumer goods at attractive prices
 That helped drive mechanisation, urbanisation & Britain’s 
first ‘Industrial Revolution’
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Fig.3: Early Steam Engine Developments
Thompson’s Atmospheric Beam 
Engine (ran 127 years:1791-1918)
• Already ‘old’ technology
• Size of a house
• Pumped water from Derbyshire  
mines
Bell Crank Engine - rotary power (ran 
120 years: 1810-1930) 
• ‘New’ technology
• Size of small bathroom
• 1799 Murdoch patent;
• 1799-1819: Boulton & Watt built 75
Both in Science Museum, London
Source: Allen (2009, 165))
Pumping Engine 
Coal Use: from 45 
lbs/hp-hour in 
1727 to 2  lbs in 
1852
• 1698-1733 Savery’s patent.
• 1710-12 Newcomen’s ‘atmospheric 
engine’
• 1769-1800: Watt’s separate 
condenser patent
• Then higher pressure steam,  
compound boilers & Corliss valves
• Big efficiency/cost gains
Fig. 4: Sources of Power, 1760-1907 (shares; total)
Sources of Power, 1760-1907 (1000 hp)
Source: Kanefsky, 1979 (in Crafts 2004). Excludes animal/human power
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Energy Services: UK lighting experience
 The energy is for energy services that people value
 illumination, transportation, cooked meals, 
refrigeration, comfortable temperatures…
 Evidence: extraordinary potential of innovation to cut
costs, enhance quality & raise welfare
 Example: UK lighting services (1300-2000)
 Innovation in fuels, technologies, infrastructures & 
production, mostly post-1800, cut costs, enhanced 
quality & access 
 With rising incomes, led to ‘revolutions’ in light use
 Other energy services also saw major efficiency 
improvements (Fouquet 2008)
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Fig. 5: UK Energy Service Transitions: Lighting –
Candles, Gas, Kerosene & Electricity (1700-2000) 
By 2000, mostly through greater conversion 
efficiency, lighting costs fell to 1/3000 of 
1800 cost;  per capita use rose 6500-fold
Electricity 
slow to 
match gas 
cost (40 
years: 1880-
1920)
2. A Low Carbon Industrial Revolution?
A Low Carbon Industrial Revolution?* (I)
 It has been argued that a UK low carbon transition 
could/should amount to a low carbon industrial revolution. 
 Two propositions underlie this claim
 Productivity gains & economic benefits would resemble 
those of past revolutions
 The necessary scale of changes in technologies, institutions 
& practices compares with those of past industrial 
revolutions or ‘waves’ of technological transformation
 The attraction of a New Industrial Revolution is clear:
 Earlier revolutions saw new technologies displace incumbent, 
less efficient energy sources (wood, charcoal, water, animal & 
human power), technologies & institutions;
 And led to a growing & sustained stream of productivity 
improvements, innovations & economic gains
* Pearson & Foxon (2012)
So, what led to Britain’s Industrial Revolution?
 Two views: “Allen (2009) stresses that the new technologies were 
invented in Britain because they were profitable there but not 
elsewhere, while Mokyr (2009) sees the Enlightenment as highly 
significant & underestimated by previous scholars,” Crafts (2010) 
 Allen: high wages & cheap energy (coal) led to demand for 
technologies to substitute energy & capital for relatively costly 
labour – e.g. for the steam engine, Britain needed to pump water 
from coal mines & had the cheap fuel (coal) required 
 Mokyr: ideology of the Enlightenment improved technological 
capabilities & institutional quality, enabling Britain to exploit its 
human & physical resource endowment – a supply-side argument
 Crafts: Allen & Mokyr’s approaches are complementary
 These & other analyses show how socio-economic, institutional & 
technological factors catalysed & sustained the long drawn-out 
Industrial Revolution
Technological change, economic growth & the GPT
 General Purpose Technologies (GPTs): 3 properties - ”A single 
generic technology […] that initially has much scope for 
improvement & eventually comes to be widely used, to have 
many uses, & to have many spillover effects” (Lipsey et al. 2005).
 E.g. steam engines, electrification, ICE & ICT 
 The GPT helps explain why the 1st Revolution’s technical 
progress went on, instead of petering out, as before.
 GPTs raised productivity growth - but took many decades
 Since a GPT’s penetration involves a long ‘acclimatisation’ phase
 While other technologies, forms of organisation, institutions & 
consumption patterns adapt to & gain from the GPT
 E.g. steam: hard to find productivity effects until after 1850, with 
growth of railways, steamships &other uses (Crafts, 2004)
 The set of available low carbon technologies don’t yet seem to
show all 3 properties of GPTs
Technological Revolutions & Techno-Economic Paradigms
 In a related approach, evolutionary economists (Freeman & 
Perez 1988, Perez 2009) identified 5 technological revolutions: 
 Clustered interrelated technology systems that eventually 
transformed the whole economy
 But full benefits realised slowly: wider institutions & practices 
adapted in a turbulent process of diffusion & assimilation
 The techno-economic paradigm is the vehicle of transformation 
– a ‘best practice’ model that:
 Gradually becomes a shared common sense or ‘logic’
 Shaping the trajectories of technologies, institutions, 
expectations &  behaviour
 Eventually becoming a powerful inertial force hindering the 
next revolution
 Much recent research has investigated the role played by 
incumbents (firms, technologies, institutions…)
Displacing  & embracing high carbon incumbents
 Low carbon technologies must compete with & displace 
incumbent fossil fuels, technologies & institutions 
 Low carbon technologies have the socially desirable but not 
fully priced characteristic of low CO2 emissions
 But as yet, except in niches, they tend to lack attributes 
with superior private market value to entrenched fossil fuels
 Several analyses emphasise the path dependent, locked in 
states of incumbent high carbon technologies & institutions
 While other analyses have also pointed to possibilities of  
path creation & creative accumulation by incumbents
 So low carbon policy should be mindful of incumbents’ 
strategies & capabilities, both to resist & to embrace change
A Low Carbon Industrial Revolution? (II)
 The low carbon transition doesn’t yet amount to another 
industrial revolution, in terms of
 Its technologies & practices
 Their desirable bundles of attributes
 Their ability to stimulate durable long-run productivity & output gains
 A key difference: market prospects for low carbon technologies 
differ from those of  the Industrial Revolution
 Because the value of addressing climate change is a public good (& 
GHG emissions are largely unpriced ‘externalities’ – low carbon price)
 Unaided private markets unlikely to produce appropriate innovations
 The industrial revolution wasn’t a policy-driven transformation
 And low carbon policies now influenced by dynamics of the 
energy policy trilemma: climate; energy security; affordability
A Low Carbon Industrial Revolution? (III)
 The benefits of industrial revolutions took many decades, while 
science shows the need for urgent, large-scale GHG cuts.
 For the low carbon transition to ‘work’, we need quickly to 
transform our energy & related systems in profound & 
revolutionary ways 
 This will require societal & governance changes on a scale like 
those of previous industrial revolutions
 Which may have more in common with late 19th Century 
developments in clean water supply, sewerage infrastructure &
health (which were about public goods), than with previous 
high carbon revolutions (mostly about private goods)
 This would then be a different kind of industrial revolution
Summary Points (I)
Time & inertia
 The transformations of Industrial Revolutions/long waves 
took time because not only profound technological 
changes but also socioeconomic & governance changes 
(with political repercussions) were needed.
 We have to worry as much about the socio-economic & 
governance aspects as the technological ones
Incumbents
 High-carbon Incumbents of all kinds are not necessarily 
all bad news for the low carbon transition
 It matters to harness their expertise, technical & financial 
resources, to encourage low carbon developments & the 
transformation of the old into the new 
Summary Points (II)
History as blueprint?
 I’m not saying that the Industrial Revolution is a blueprint 
for a low carbon transition(it was, after all, a high-carbon
transformation)
 But studying processes of socio-technical change & their 
historical dynamics gives clues about what issues, 
interactions & policies deserve policy & academic 
attention
The low carbon transition challenge
 Main benefits seen as communal risk reduction for the 
future
 Doesn’t yet offer the benefits of the new low-cost goods & 
services of earlier industrial revolutions – a key societal & 
policy challenge
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